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Scholars often argue that whereas unanimous rulings should boost public support for court 
decisions, dissents should fuel public opposition. Previous studies on public responses to U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions suggest that unanimity does in fact bolster support. However, a recent 
study also find that dissents may increase support among opponents of a court decision by 
suggesting evidence of procedural justice. By examining how individuals react to dissents from 
the Supreme Court of Norway, this article is the first study outside the U.S. context of the 
public’s reaction to unanimity and dissent. Breaking with the common notion of the negative 
effects of dissent on public support, the article shows that when the Supreme Court handles 
cases of higher political salience, the formulation of dissenting opinions can be a meaningful 
way of securing greater support for its policy outputs by suggesting evidence of procedural 
justice. Contrary to recent studies, however, this positive influence of dissent is irrespective of 
individuals’ ex ante policy views.  
 





Armed with powers of constitutional review, European high courts have experienced increased 
political significance (Tate and Vallinder 1995, Hirschl 2004, Sweet 2000, 1992, 2002). The 
judicialization of European politics has involved an expansion of the power of courts and judges 
in determining public policy outcomes, mainly through judgments pertaining to individual 
rights’ protection or the limits of legislative or executive powers (Hirschl 2009). Consequently, 
it is of increasing importance to understand the factors that influence public support or 
opposition to court decisions. 
The extent to which justices agree or disagree on the solution of a case has often been 
hypothesized as influencing public support.1 Justices and judicial scholars frequently argue that 
whereas unanimity should boost public support for court decisions, dissent should fuel public 
opposition (for an overview, see Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott 2009, Salamone 2014). This alleged 
negative relationship between dissent and the courts’ standing with the public has been one of 
the reasons why some European constitutional courts used to (or still do) prohibit the 
publication of dissenting opinions (Kelemen 2018) and that, for those courts that publish 
dissents, norms of consensus have tended to suppress the formalization of conflicting opinions 
in an effort to bolster legitimacy (e.g. Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988, Hendershot et al. 2013). 
Despite the presumed harmful effect of judicial dissent on public support, only a handful 
of empirical studies from the United States exist on this relationship. The results of these studies 
are also inconsistent. Whereas some studies show no effect of unanimity or dissent on public 
opinion (Peterson 1981, Marshall 1987, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005), other studies 
suggest that unanimity does in fact bolster support (Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott 2009). In a recent 
study, however, Salamone (2014) breaks with the accepted notions in the literature and argues 
that dissents may help increase support of issues of higher salience among the court’s policy 
opponents by suggesting evidence of procedural justice. Hence, the dynamics of how dissent 
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might influence public support appear contingent upon individuals’ preexisting attitudes toward 
the issues at stake. 
This article expands upon the existing research on the relationship between judicial 
dissent and popular support through a series of original survey-based experiments using a 
nationally representative sample of Norway’s population. The Norwegian Supreme Court offers 
a relevant and testable European case on the relationship between courts and their citizenry. 
Unlike several of its European counterparts, the Supreme Court has made individual justice 
opinions and dissents open to the public since 1863 (Mestad 2015, Østlid 1955). Today, one in 
five decisions from the court involves one or more dissenting opinions. In addition, during the 
last few decades, the Supreme Court has emerged as a more prominent and consequential 
policymaker in the Norwegian judicial and political system (e.g., Grendstad, Shaffer, 
Waltenburg 2015). We should thus expect the Court to have a greater ability to shape public 
opinion on issues of national interest. Understanding the potential role dissents play in shaping 
public opinion and support is an important aspect in this regard. 
The article examines the relationship between dissent and public support through a 
series of vignette experiments covering three fictitious Supreme Court decisions on issues that 
represent a range of legal and political salience among the Norwegian public: 1) a high-salience 
asylum decision concerning residence permits for children of illegal immigrants, 2) a medium-
salience workplace-privacy decision concerning an employer’s right to read email and text 
messages on phones provided by the company, and (3) a low-salience decision concerning 
whether neighbor conflicts should be resolved by means of mediation or through litigation in 
the court system. The vignettes, which presented the outcomes of each of the fictitious 
decisions, were read by the participants; information about whether the decisions were 
unanimous or dissensual was randomized. In addition, the experiments were designed to capture 
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how policy supporters and policy opponents evaluate unanimity and dissent, as well as to 
account for an individual’s diffuse support for the Supreme Court.  
Breaking with accepted notions in the literature, the results of the experimental vignettes 
show no significant influence of unanimous decisions on public acceptance of court decisions. 
Instead, the results demonstrate that dissent leads to greater acceptance of the high-salience 
asylum decision by suggesting evidence of procedural justice. This observed effect of dissent 
on levels of acceptance is significant across both ex-ante supporters and ex-ante opponents, 
which is contrary Salamone (2014) who shows that dissent primarily has a positive influence 
on support among ex-ante opponents. However, that dissent has a more general effect on public 
acceptance is consistent with expectations that individuals’ support for policy outputs is rooted 
in their commitments to democratic values and processes (e.g. Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 
Gibson and Nelson 2015, Gibson 2007). Finally, the article demonstrates a substantial influence 
of diffuse support on public acceptance across the three court decisions, which underscores the 
importance for Supreme Courts to maintain a ‘reservoir’ of diffuse support or legitimacy if they 
are to gain acceptance for decisions that are unpopular among segments of the population. 
In the following sections, the article first discusses the widespread concerns in the 
literature about the public policy consequences of dissents while also making a case for why 
we instead should expect dissents to have a positive influence on public support for court 
decisions. The article then presents the experimental design and data generation process. 
Finally, the results of the vignette experiments are discussed, and the conclusion summarizes 
the article’s main contributions and offers suggestions for future studies. 
Judicial dissent and public support for court decisions 
When high courts review laws, justices must sometimes confront disagreements inherent in the 
legislative context on issues over which legislators and society may be deeply divided. 
However, because justices are usually appointed and not elected, they confront these issues 
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without being electorally accountable. Consequently, scholars often argue, courts, perhaps 
more than the elected branches of government, require a reservoir of legitimacy and public 
support to gain acceptance for unpopular decisions (see, for example, Gibson and Nelson 2014, 
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005). 
Several studies have demonstrated the number of ways in which courts may influence 
public opinion and support (see, for example, Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen 2006, 
Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Grosskopf and Mondak 1998, Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Johnson 
and Martin 1998, Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001, Gibson and Caldeira 2003, Mondak 
1990, 1991, 1992). According to this literature, court decisions, particularly on issues of 
national interest, may have an impact on public opinion, which can manifest itself either as 
increased support or increased opposition to the position taken by the court. However, there has 
been little research on the role of judicial dissent in influencing mass opinion. This is puzzling, 
given that justices and scholars in the United States and elsewhere have frequently debated 
whether dissents are good or bad for public support.  
On the one hand, judicial scholars frequently express concern about the public opinion 
consequences of handing down dissensual decisions (see, for example, Hettinger, Lindquist, 
and Martinek 2006, Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1999, Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988, 
Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott 2009, Salamone 2014). A common argument is that whereas the 
absence of dissent may promote the perception that the law is applied in a uniform and impartial 
manner, the occurrence of dissent may ‘shake public confidence in the judiciary by bringing 
into question the certainty of the law’ (Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988, 387). This alleged 
negative relationship between dissent and public confidence echoes the widely held view that 
the legitimacy of high courts is contingent upon the extent to which the public perceives them 
to be apolitical and neutral adjudicators of the law (see, for example, Scheb and Lyons 2001, 
Gibson and Nelson 2017). According to these views, dissent should have a generally harmful 
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effect on public support, and this should be true regardless of whether individuals hold a 
favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the courts’ policy output. 
On the other hand, dissent may help democratize a court by bringing different 
viewpoints to the deliberative process (see, for example, Peterson 1981, Brennan 1985, Dubé 
2000). Contrary to conventional views on the harm of dissent, such a democratizing effect of 
dissents might lead to greater support for dissensual decisions. This argument rests on studies 
that have demonstrated that legitimacy and support for courts are rooted in commitment to 
democratic values and processes (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, Gibson and Nelson 2015, Gibson 
2007). In addition, studies in the social psychology of law and legal compliance suggest that 
perceptions of procedural justice and the fairness of the resolution process are central to our 
evaluation of judicial outcomes (see, for example, Tyler 2006, Tyler and Rasinski 1991, Tyler 
1988). Accordingly, when individuals see evidence of debate in court – as shown by dissenting 
opinions – they might ‘interpret it as the result of a fair, democratic decision-making process in 
which both sides were heard’ (Salamone 2014, 322). This positive influence of dissent on 
acceptance might be particularly prevalent among the ‘losers’ of a court decision. Whereas 
‘winners’ will ordinarily accept a court decision with which they agree (Gibson and Nelson 
2014), losers should be more inclined to make evaluations of procedural fairness when they 
decide whether to support a decision or not (Lind and Tyler 1988, 111).  
Of course, whether unanimity or dissent can influence public support is not expected to 
be uniform across all issues. The extent to which courts can influence individuals’ acceptance 
of a decision by means of unanimity and dissent should depend on the salience of the issue at 
hand (see Salamone 2014, Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott 2009). For example, studies of public 
evaluations of U.S. Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the Court is less able to influence 
opinion when a policy is of high ideological salience (Brickman 2006, Grosskopf and Mondak 
1998, Hoekstra and Segal 1996, Johnson and Martin 1998, Mondak 1990, 1992, 1991). This 
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finding is supported by studies in social psychology (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo 1986) and political 
behavior (e.g. Zaller 1992) demonstrating that individuals are more difficult to persuade when 
they hold strong (or crystallized) opinions about a topic but are persuadable when they are 
moderately (or to a lesser degree) engaged with an issue. 
On this basis, unanimity and dissent should have little influence on individuals’ 
evaluations of court outputs on highly salient (“hot button”) issues on which they hold strong 
and crystallized opinions. However, on moderately salient issues, unanimity and dissent might 
invoke a reaction consistent with any of the expectations discussed above. Because of the 
moderate levels of salience, opinions on these issues should not be so crystallized in the minds 
of the public that they cannot be moved. However, at the same time, people should feel enough 
attachment to these issues so that it might matter for them if the decision is made unanimously 
in their (dis)favor or whether a dissenting minority is seen to represent their policy views. 
Finally, courts should quite easily be able to move opinion on issues of very low salience, as 
individuals should be quite willing to defer to perceived experts on matters in which they have 
not invested much thought. However, as people will be less politically invested in these issues, 
we should not expect dissent to invoke any strong feelings of procedural justice (see Zink, 
Spriggs II, and Scott 2009, Salamone 2014). 
Previous studies of the public opinion consequences of dissent 
Despite widespread concerns about the public policy consequences of dissent, the first few 
studies on this topic found little evidence of this effect. In a review of the literature on the causes 
and consequences of judicial dissent in the Unites States, Peterson (1981) noted that dissent 
might weaken a court’s authority, but he argued that this was unlikely because of the limited 
public awareness of the workings of the courts. A few years later, Marshall (1987) conducted a 
study of opinion polls before and after 18 U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Among several factors 
believed to affect public reactions to court decisions, Marshall included a measure of whether 
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decisions were unanimous or not. His results showed no significant effect of unanimity on 
public opinion. However, it should be noted that only two of the decisions in Marshall’s sample 
were unanimous. 
Two decades after Marshall’s study, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2005) included 
dissent among several other factors in an experimental vignette study about a fictional case 
dealing with the handling of the Florida ballots in the wake of the 2000 presidential election. 
Unlike Marshall (1987), the authors focused on factors affecting public acquiescence to court 
decisions. For the specific manipulation of dissent, the participants were given vignettes 
characterized either as “deeply divided along partisan lines” or as “consensual and therefore 
not divided by party”. Again, however, the results showed little evidence for the hypothesis that 
sharp divisions lead to lower acceptance of the outcomes of court decisions.  
Two subsequent experimental studies would yield different (though conflicting) results. 
In the first experiment, Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott (2009) presented individuals with mock 
newspaper articles reporting on Supreme Court decisions in which they systematically varied 
unanimity and dissent and the court’s upholding or overturning precedents. Unlike Gibson, 
Caldeira, and Spence (2005), the authors included a manipulation for dissent independent of 
partisanship (i.e., “unanimous” or “minimum winning coalition”). In addition, they conducted 
experiments on a range of cases on different political issues of varying levels of salience. 
Contrasting previous studies, they found that unanimous rulings (as opposed to dissenting ones) 
boost support for Supreme Court decisions at all levels of salience and among all participants, 
including those who disagreed with the court’s policy output.  
In a second experiment, Salamone (2014) sought to improve on the two former studies 
by examining the influence of unanimity and dissent in isolation from other factors. In addition, 
Salamone considered the distinction between large and small dissenting majorities by 
separating out decisions that were unanimous, divided eight-to-one, or divided five-to-four. The 
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results of the study showed no effect of unanimity or dissent among those who stated that they 
agreed with the policy outcome of the court’s decisions. However, among those who disagreed 
with the court’s policy outcome, Salamone found that unanimity and large majorities led to 
higher acceptance of the low-salience contract dispute resolution and, conversely, that 
dissensual decisions (including both five-to-four and eight-to-one decisions) led to higher 
acceptance among the court’s opponents in a moderately salient workplace-privacy decision by 
suggesting evidence of procedural justice. 
Overall, recent experimental studies demonstrate that unanimity (as opposed to dissent) 
might foster higher levels of acceptance of Supreme Court decisions (in particular, Zink, 
Spriggs II, and Scott 2009), though this appears to be the case primarily with issues of low 
salience (Salamone 2014). In addition, Salamone’s (2014) study suggests that we should 
include the possibility that dissent may foster greater levels of support for moderately salient 
issues by suggesting evidence of procedural justice.  
The Supreme Court of Norway and the public 
Little research exists on the relationship between dissent and public opinion and support outside 
the U.S. context. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Norway constitutes a relevant and testable 
European case. The Supreme Court began to publish individual justice opinions, including those 
supporting dissents, in 1863 (Mestad 2015). The decision to publish individual opinions did not 
come about without debate. For over four decades, the Supreme Court fought against proposals 
in parliament to make opinions public. A central reason for the court’s resistance was that it 
had serious concerns about its reputation with the public (Østlid 1955). 
The number of dissents in the Supreme Court has varied over time. In the decades 
following World War II, the annual percentage of dissensual decisions fluctuated between 10 
and 20% before reaching its lowest level in the late 1980s (Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg 
2015, 69). Then, during the last two decades, the number of dissents increased in the 1990s, 
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reaching a record high of 29% in 1999, before stabilizing at a rate of 20% annually in the 
twenty-first century. The rise in dissents in the 1990s was mainly catalyzed by a reform of the 
criminal procedures in 1995, which secured the Court near-complete discretionary jurisdiction 
over its criminal caseload (Bentsen 2017). Since then, the court has only accepted cases for 
review that are expected to be instrumental to the development of Norwegian law (Bentsen 
2017, Skiple et al. 2016, Sunde 2015, Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2015).  
Citizens usually rely on the media for information about court cases (Stoutenborough, 
Haider-Markel, and Allen 2006, Zilis 2015, Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001). 
Historically, the Norwegian media’s coverage of the Supreme Court has been irregular and 
sporadic (Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2017). The depoliticized nature of judicial 
appointments to the court has been identified as a central reason for this.2 In addition, because 
the Norwegian legal system is highly trusted, the Supreme Court justices have seen little need 
to use the media to maintain or increase the Court’s standing among its citizens (Grendstad, 
Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2017). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the public has been 
unaware of the daily workings and decisions of the Supreme Court.  
However, in the last few decades, the Supreme Court has emerged as a more prominent 
and consequential policymaker in the Norwegian judicial and political system (e.g., Grendstad, 
Shaffer, Waltenburg 2015). Consequently, it has come under greater scrutiny by the media. In 
particular, in their reporting on the Supreme Court, the media has given greater attention to 
individual justices, and this appears especially true when referencing those justices authoring 
or joining dissents (Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2017, 249). Therefore, we can assume 
that today’s Supreme Court will have a greater potential to shape public opinion on issues of 
national interest. Understanding the role dissents play in shaping public opinion and support is 
an important aspect in this regard.  
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Experimental design 
To examine the relationship between Supreme Court dissent and public support, I use a series 
of survey-based vignette experiments included in Wave 7 of the Norwegian Citizen Panel 
(NCP) conducted from November 1 to December 2, 2016. The NCP is a research-purpose web-
based panel owned by the University of Bergen. The participants in the NCP have been 
recruited via random sampling from the official national population registry and are 
representative of both the online and offline population older than 18 years of age in Norway. 
In total, the data for the present experiment comprises 1085 registered participants.3 
The experimental survey covered three issue areas that represent a range of legal and 
political salience among the Norwegian public: a high-salience asylum decision concerning the 
issuing of residence permits for children of illegal immigrants that are being deported, a 
medium-salience workplace-privacy decision concerning an employer’s right to read the emails 
and text messages on a phone provided by the company, and a low-salience decision concerning 
whether neighbor conflicts should be resolved by means of mediation or through litigation in 
the court system. Whereas asylum issues – particularly those involving the rights of children – 
have been of high salience in Norwegian public debate in the aftermath of the European ‘refugee 
crisis’ of 2015 (see Skiple, Gudbrandsen, and Grendstad 2013), the other issue areas were 
selected based on their relative degree of public salience. This difference in issue area and 
salience is important in order to address the differential influence of unanimity and dissent on 
public opinion discussed above.  
In total, the experiment comprised two parts: (1) a pretreatment questionnaire asking the 
participants about their policy positions on the above three issues and about their diffuse support 
(or legitimacy) of the Supreme Court, and (2) a series of vignettes describing fictitious Supreme 
Court decisions, including a post-treatment question about the participants’ acceptance of the 
decisions. Prior to the experiment, the participants were asked to read the following short text 
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about the Supreme Court: “You will now be asked a few questions about the Norwegian 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and last court of appeal. 
Ordinary cases are usually decided by a panel of five justices.” This information was provided 
because we may assume that several of the participants in the survey were unaware of the fact 
that most Supreme Court decisions are made by five-justice panels. (A complete and translated 
overview of the pretreatment questionnaire and of the experimental vignettes is available in the 
appendix).  
Pretreatment questionnaire 
Prior to treatment, all participants were first asked questions about their policy positions on the 
three separate issues (these questions can be found in the appendix, section A). To avoid 
priming the participants, these questions were asked together with a range of other unrelated 
questions in the survey (this procedure is similar to Salamone 2014). That said, we are unable 
to fully eliminate the possibility that individuals, by virtue of already having declared their 
attitudes on the issues earlier in the survey, have been put in a position of reconciling their 
attitudes with the position of the Supreme Court and thus chose their own position over the 
position of the Supreme Court. However, this type of priming should not negatively influence 
treatment effects, given that in a situation in which individuals are fully primed to follow their 
ex-ante positions, we should not expect unanimity or dissent to have any substantial influence 
on their opinions. In other words, if individuals are primed to follow their initial policy position, 
the experiment should constitute a stricter test of the influence of unanimity and dissent.  
The answers to the ex-ante policy questions were later used to create measures 
indicating whether the position of a participant prior to treatment was the same as that described 
in the vignette randomly assigned to her (or not). Accordingly, if a participant was given a 
vignette of a Supreme Court decision reflecting her policy positions on the issue, she is 
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considered an ex-ante supporter of the decision. If a participant was given a vignette with a 
Supreme Court decision opposing her policy position, she is considered an ex-ante opponent. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 shows the distributions of the participants’ responses to the three policy 
statements. As expected, we can see that the participants are highly polarized in their position 
on the high-salience asylum issue, while the medium-salience workplace-privacy issue and the 
low-salience neighbor dispute issue produce less polarization. Looking at the proportions of 
participants agreeing or disagreeing, 39% agree that children of illegal immigrants should be 
allowed to stay in Norway if their parents are evicted, while 44% disagree with this statement. 
On the workplace-privacy issue, 21% agree that employers should have a right to read texts and 
emails on company cell phones, while 72% disagree. Finally, as many as 91% of the participants 
agree that neighbor conflicts ought to be resolved by mediation and not in the courts, while only 
4% disagree. 
In addition to the questions about their policy preferences, the participants were given 
four questions about the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy (the questions can be found 
in the appendix, section A). These questions are designed to capture the participant’s diffuse 
support for the institution (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003, 
2005) and are commonly used in the literature on judicial support and legitimacy (see, for 
example, Gibson and Caldeira 1995, Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott 2009, Salamone 2014, Gibson 
and Nelson 2015, Bartels and Johnston 2013).4 Whereas specific support refers to the court’s 
decisions (i.e., what they in this experiment are asked to evaluate), diffuse support refers to a 
reservoir of good will or favorable attitudes that help individuals tolerate outputs that they 
oppose (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003, Easton 1965, 1975, Gibson and Nelson 2014). 
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Caldeira and Gibson (1992) conceptualize diffuse support for judicial institutions as 
synonymous with legitimacy. This is an important control in the analysis because we should 
assume that those with low faith in the institution would generally have a lower likelihood of 
accepting its decisions (e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005) and that this should be true 
regardless of whether the decision is unanimous or dissensual (Salamone 2014). 
Experimental vignettes 
After completing the pretreatment questionnaire, the participants were exposed to a series of 
vignettes about three fictitious Supreme Court decisions on the above issues (the vignettes can 
be found in the appendix, section B).5 The participants were randomly assigned to three groups: 
a baseline group in which participants were given no information about unanimity or dissents; 
a treatment group presented with a unanimous decision; and a treatment group presented with 
a dissensual three-two decision (i.e., the experiment is a 2x2 with a baseline group). In addition, 
the experiment randomly varied the outcome of the decision in order to control for the 
possibility that the results are driven by the participants’ policy preferences for or against the 
decision.  
For each vignette, the participants were asked about the degree to which they find the 
decision acceptable (coded 1 to 5, with larger scores indicating greater acceptance). This is in 
line with a common research design in the literature on courts and public opinions, which 
usually involves presenting individuals with a court decision with which they either agree or 
disagree and then ascertaining whether the characteristics of the court ruling increases the 
probability of an individual accepting the decision or not (e.g., Salamone 2014, Gibson, 
Caldeira, and Spence 2005, Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott 2009).6 The wording of the experimental 
vignettes was as follows (the following example is for the asylum decision): 
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Several immigrant children have parents who are residing illegally in Norway. Imagine 
that the Supreme Court [no information; unanimously; by a bare majority of three 
against two judges] decided that these children [should be; should not be] entitled to 
stay in Norway if the parents are deported. In general, to what extent do you think this 
would be an acceptable decision by the Supreme Court? 
 
Analysis and results 
To examine the relationship between dissent and public support, I ran two sets of logistic 
regression analyses of the extent to which individuals accept or reject each of the three fictitious 
court decisions. Whereas the first set of analyses examines the effects of the main treatment 
(unanimity/dissent), the second set of analyses tests whether unanimity and dissent have a 
differential influence on acceptance rates among ex-ante supporters and ex-ante opponents. 
Positive influence of dissent on acceptance of high-salience issues 
The first sets of analyses examine the general influence of the treatments (unanimous/dissent) 
when controlling for diffuse support. For each decision, the analyses compare the effect of each 
treatment category to the baseline referent category for which the participants received no 
information regarding majority size. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 2. In 
addition, Figure 1 presents the change in terms of the probability of acceptance of each of the 
court decisions for the various treatment groups compared with the untreated baseline group.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Looking at the treatment effects of unanimity and dissent, there are no negative effects 
of dissent on levels of acceptance for any of the three decisions. Instead, there is a positive and 
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statistically significant effect of dissent on participants’ acceptance of the high-salience asylum 
decision. More specifically, there is a 9% increase in the levels of acceptance of the dissensual 
decision when compared to the levels of support in the untreated baseline group. This finding 
supports the alternative theoretical expectation that dissensual decisions might lead to greater 
levels of acceptance by suggesting evidence of procedural justice (e.g., Salamone 2014). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The effects of the treatments on the two other issues indicate further support for this 
finding. There is a 4% increase in the acceptance of the dissensual privacy decision and a close 
to 4% increase in acceptance of the dissensual neighbor conflict decision. However, the 
differences in acceptance rates across these treatment groups fail standard statistical 
significance tests. Thus, it is only on the high-salience asylum issue that dissent has any positive 
and generalizable influence on citizens’ acceptance of the court decision. 
The results show some support for the hypothesis that unanimity might foster greater 
acceptance of the asylum decision and the neighbor conflict decision. There is a 5% increase in 
acceptance of the unanimous asylum decision and a 5% increase in support for the neighbor 
conflict decision (when compared to the untreated baseline group). However, these differences 
fail statistical significance tests, and we are unable to conclude whether this is in fact the case 
for the public at large. Nevertheless, these findings are important insofar as they suggest that 
individuals’ evaluations of the court’s policy output do not appear to increase significantly 
because of unanimity.  
Lastly, there is a positive and statistically significant influence of diffuse support on 
acceptance rates across the three court decisions. Hence, when citizens are asked to evaluate 
Supreme Court decisions, they will have a greater propensity to accept the decision if they have 
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a high regard for the Supreme Court as an institution from the outset. This is an important 
finding insofar as it confirms the theoretical assumptions and findings in the previous empirical 
literature that high courts rely on diffuse support to gain acceptance of their decisions (e.g., 
Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott 2009, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005).  
Ex-ante policy views 
In the second set of analyses, I include interaction terms between the treatments and the variable 
capturing whether individuals are either ex-ante supporters or ex-ante opponents of the 
decision. These interactions are included to test whether unanimity or dissent have a different 
influence on acceptance rates among ex-ante supporters and ex-ante opponents. Note, however, 
that individuals’ support or opposition to the decisions is not randomly assigned. While we are 
able to randomize whether individuals are given a favorable or unfavorable decision based on 
their pre-existing attitudes, we are naturally unable to randomize individuals’ pre-existing 
policy positions on these issues. Consequently, a number of covariates might predict the ex-
ante policy views that form the basis for the agreement determination. The following analysis 
thus includes a number of control variables related to partisanship (i.e., whether they would 
vote for either a left-of-center or a right-of-center party in the next election) and 
sociodemographic factors (i.e., the participants’ gender, education and age), which might be 
related to the participants’ pre-existing policy positions on the three issues. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results of the second sets of regressions are presented in Table 3. First, we see that 
there is a statistically significant and substantial influence of ex-ante policy positions on 
acceptance across all three decisions. Because of the added interaction term, the effects of the 
Ex-ante opponent variable are interpreted as the difference in acceptance between ex-ante 
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opponents and ex-ante supporters in the baseline group: for this treatment group, ex-ante 
opponents have a 53% lower level of acceptance for the asylum decision when compared to ex-
ante supporters. For the privacy and neighbor conflict decisions, the difference in acceptance 
between supporters and opponents is 61% and 68%.  
However, although there is a large difference between ex-ante supporters and ex-ante 
opponents in their post-treatment evaluations of all three court decisions, there are no 
statistically significant effects of the added interaction terms between the treatments 
(unanimous/dissent) and the participants’ ex-ante policy views. Hence, the extent to which 
unanimity or dissent influences acceptance rates across the three issues is not conditional on 
whether individuals are predisposed to either support or oppose the decisions they were asked 
to evaluate. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Again, there is statistically significant effect of diffuse support on acceptance rates 
across all issues. Figure 2 shows the levels of acceptance for each decision conditional on the 
participants’ pretreatment policy views. Among both ex-ante supporters and ex-ante opponents, 
the levels of acceptance of each court decision increases as the levels of diffuse support 
increases. If we look specifically at ex-ante opponents, the influence of high levels of diffuse 
support is strongest among those who were given the high-salience asylum decision. For this 
decision, acceptance levels are almost 50% higher among those who hold the Court in the 
highest regard when compared to those who hold it in very low regard. Consequently, when 
citizens are asked to evaluate unfavorable and politically salient Supreme Court decisions, they 
will have a greater propensity to accept the decision if from the onset they have a high regard 
for the Supreme Court as an institution.  
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Discussions and conclusion 
As European courts are experiencing growing political power (e.g., Tate and Vallinder 1995, 
Hirschl 2004, Sweet 2000, 1992, 2002), it is of increasing importance to understand what 
factors influence popular support or opposition to court decisions. One important aspect in this 
regard concerns the public’s evaluations of unanimity and dissent. However, despite 
widespread concerns about the public policy consequences of dissents, the literature on the 
relationship between dissent and public opinion is sparse and limited to the U.S. public’s 
evaluations of Supreme Court decisions.  
This article offers the first study of public reactions to judicial dissent outside the U.S. 
context by conducting a series of survey-based vignette experiments on a nationally 
representative sample of Norway’s population. The vignettes covered three fictitious Supreme 
Court decisions on issues that represent a range of legal and political salience among the 
Norwegian public. In addition, the experiment was designed to capture how policy supporters 
and policy opponents evaluate dissensual decisions in order to test the alternative expectation 
that policy opponents might show greater support for a dissensual decision because they see 
their policy views represented in the outcome.  
Breaking with accepted notions in the literature, the experimental results show no 
significant influence of unanimous decisions on public acceptance of court decisions. In 
addition, there is no evidence in the experimental data suggesting that dissent has a negative 
influence on people’s support for court decisions. Instead, the results demonstrate that dissent 
leads to greater acceptance of the high-salience asylum decision by suggesting evidence of 
procedural justice. This observed effect of dissent on levels of acceptance is significant across 
both ex-ante supporters and ex-ante opponents, which is contrary to the expectation that 
opponents (or ‘losers’) of a court decision should be more inclined than supporters (‘winners’) 
to make evaluations of procedural justices when they decide to oppose a decision or not. This 
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is also contrary to the experimental results by Salamone (2014), which shows that dissent 
primarily has a positive influence on support among ex-ante opponents. However, that dissent 
has a more general effect on public acceptance is consistent with expectations that individuals’ 
support for policy outputs is rooted in their commitments to democratic values and processes 
(e.g. Caldeira and Gibson 1992, Gibson and Nelson 2015, Gibson 2007). 
Dissent only moves opinion on the high-salience asylum issue, which is contrary to the 
theoretical expectation that courts should have a difficult time influencing public opinion on 
“hot button” issues on which individuals hold strong and crystallized opinions. There are two 
potential explanations for this result. First, we might assume that when the public is highly 
polarized on an issue, which is arguably the case concerning the rights of immigrant children 
in Norway, they might expect justices to be polarized on the issue as well. Evidence that both 
sides of the issue have been heard – as shown by the dissenting opinion – should therefore 
matter more when public opinion is polarized. To put it more succinctly, procedural justice 
might play a greater role in the evaluations of court decisions on issues on which the public is 
polarized, which might explain why dissent leads to greater levels of acceptance of the high-
salience asylum decision. Future studies could address the relationship between issue 
polarization and procedural justice more directly. 
The second explanation regards the relative salience of the asylum issue. Although 
questions about the rights of immigrant children have been of high salience in Norwegian public 
debate in the wake of the 2015 European ‘immigration crisis’, it might be considered less salient 
that those “hot-button” issues included in existing experimental studies in the United States 
(e.g., gay marriage, Florida ballots, abortion). This is especially true if we consider the decisive 
role the U.S. Supreme Court plays in deciding these issues. Hence, the observed effect of dissent 
on individuals’ acceptance of the asylum issue might instead be regarded as evidence that courts 
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should have an easier time moving public opinion on moderately salient issues on which 
opinions are not fully crystallized in the minds of the public. 
In addition to the effects of dissent on acceptance rates, there is a substantial influence 
of diffuse support on public acceptance across the three court decisions. Most importantly, there 
is a relatively strong influence of high levels of diffuse support on acceptance rates among ex-
ante opponents of the high-salience asylum decisions. This is an important finding insofar as it 
confirms the theoretical assumptions and findings in the previous empirical literature that high 
courts rely on diffuse support to gain acceptance of unpopular decisions (e.g., Zink, Spriggs II, 
and Scott 2009, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005). Moreover, this result underscores the 
importance for Supreme Courts to maintain a ‘reservoir’ of diffuse support or legitimacy if they 
are to gain acceptance for decisions that are unpopular among segments of the population. 
Finally, as this is the first empirical study outside the U.S. context to suggest that dissent 
may bolster public acceptance of court decisions, the constraints of this one-time experiment 
still leave unanswered questions about the long-term effects of unanimity and dissents. While 
one possible implication of this study is that courts in the long term might bolster their 
legitimacy by means of publishing dissents, more research on such a long-term view would 
need to be considered if we are to reach this conclusion. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Individuals’ Ex-Ante Policy Positions 
 Agree Disagree Neither, 
Nor 
    
Immigrant children whose parents are illegal residents in Norway 
should be entitled to stay if their parents are deported. 
 
39% 44% 17% 
If an employer gives you a cell phone to be used for work, the 
employer should be allowed to read all text messages and emails sent 
and received on this phone. 
 
21% 72% 7% 
It should not be possible to bring neighbor conflicts (for example, 
about the height of trees and fences) to the court without first having 
tried to resolve the conflict through mediation. 
91% 5% 4% 
    
Note: The variables were coded on a seven-point scale: 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=somewhat agree, 
4=neither agree nor disagree, 5=somewhat disagree, 6=disagree, and 7=strongly disagree. Data: Norwegian 

























Controls    












Pseudo R2 .05 .02 .03 
N 1046 1034 1030 
*p<.05 (two-tailed). Note: Effects of unanimity and dissent on support for 
court decisions. Effects compared to baseline group. Data: Norwegian 































Interactions    














Controls    




































Pseudo R2 .29 .31 .40 
N 804 888 906 
*p<.05 (two-tailed). Note: Effects of unanimity and dissent on support for court 
decisions conditional on ex-ante policy views. Effects compared to baseline group. 





Figure 1: Change in the probability of acceptance across treatment groups for each of the three court decisions 






Figure 2: Effects of diffuse support on ex-ante supporters’ and ex-ante opponents’ acceptance of the asylum 
decision (upper left graph), the privacy decision (upper right graph), and the neighbor conflict decision (lower left 




A. Pre-Treatment Questionnaire 
For each question, the participants were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the 
statement. Their answers were measured on a scale from one (strongly agree) to seven (strongly 
disagree).  
1.1. Ex-ante policy positions 
In general, to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements? 
1. Immigrant children whose parents are illegal residents in Norway should be entitled to 
stay in the country if their parents are deported. 
2. If an employer gives you a mobile phone to be used for work, the employer should be 
allowed to read all text messages and emails sent and received on this phone.  
3. It should not be possible to bring neighbor conflicts (for example, about the height of 
trees and fences) to the court without first having tried to resolve the conflict through 
mediation. 
1.2. Diffuse support for the Supreme Court 
In general, to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?  
1. The Supreme Court of Norway can usually be trusted to make the right decisions. 
2. The right of the Supreme Court of Norway to decide certain types of controversial issues 
should be reduced.  
3. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Norway consistently favor some groups more 
than others.  
4. If the Supreme Court of Norway started making many decisions most people disagreed 
with, it might be better to do away with the court altogether. 
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B. Experimental vignettes 
For each vignette, the participants were asked about their acceptance of the fictitious court 
decision. This was measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where higher values indicate greater levels 
of acceptance.  
2.1. Vignette for high-salience decision 
Several immigrant children have parents who are residing illegally in Norway. Imagine that the 
Supreme Court [no information, unanimously, or by a bare majority of three against two 
judges] decided that these children [should be or should not be] entitled to stay in Norway if 
their parents are deported. In general, to what extent do you think this would be an acceptable 
decision by the Supreme Court? 
2.2. Vignette for medium-salience decision 
Several employers give their employees cell phones to use for work. Imagine that the Supreme 
Court [no information, unanimously, or by a bare majority of three against two judges] 
decided that employers [should be or should not be] allowed to read all the text messages and 
emails contained on the telephones issued to the employees by the company. In general, to what 
extent do you think this would be an acceptable decision by the Supreme Court? 
2.3. Vignette for low-salience decision 
Thousands of neighbor conflicts arise in Norway every year. Imagine that the Supreme Court 
[no information, unanimously, or by a bare majority of three against two judges] decided 
that people involved in neighbor conflicts (for example, about the height of trees and fences) 
[should be or should not be] allowed to go directly to the courts without first having tried to 
resolve the conflict through mediation. In general, to what extent do you think this would be an 




1 Terms like ‘support’, ‘acquiescence’, ‘confidence’ and ‘legitimacy’ are used interchangeably 
throughout the article depending on the terms used in the relevant literature.  
2 Upon the appointment of a new justice, an independent Judicial Appointments Board, 
consisting of five representatives from the legal community and two lay members, will evaluate 
applicants and send a ranked list to the Ministry of Justice. The ministry will then transmit its 
preferred nominee to the King in Council for a formal (and symbolic) appointment. Although 
the ministry is not obliged to follow the board’s ranking, it has made no changes to its ordering. 
3 For more information about the Norwegian Citizen Panel, see http://digsscore.uib.no/panel. 
Documentation of the field methods used, response rates, and representativeness is reported in 
the online methodology report, while the data and codebook are available gratis from the 
Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). Data and documentation can be downloaded from 
http://digsscore.uib.no/data-and-documentation. A Stata script for the replication of the study 
is also available.  
4 I made a change to the wording of one of the statements used to capture diffuse support in 
previous studies of the U.S. Supreme Court. It is common to ask individuals to evaluate the 
following statement: The United States Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions 
that are right for the country as a whole. When designing the experiment, concerns were raised 
about the extent to which Norwegian citizens would ever expect the Supreme Court to make 
decisions for the country as a whole (the Norwegian Supreme Court does not usually make 
decisions as far-reaching as those of the U.S. Supreme Court). Thus, a simplified version of the 
question was included, stating that The Supreme Court of Norway can usually be trusted to 




5 The use of fictitious cases might lead to a lower external validity of the results. Hence, in an 
effort to minimize issues of external validity, the selected issues were loosely based on actual 
and potential court cases. 
6 Unlike similar studies by Salamone (2014) and Zink, Spriggs II, and Scott (2009), I do not 
ask individuals whether they agree (or not) with the decision before asking about the extent to 
which they accept the decision. Instead, I ask individuals directly about their acceptance of the 
decision, assuming that those who receive a decision that is contrary to their previously stated 
policy position on the issue are in fact in disagreement with the outcome of the decision. 
Another difference from previous studies concerns how I ask individuals about acceptance. The 
most common question in the literature asks, “Do you accept the decision? That is, do you think 
that the decision ought to be accepted and considered the final word on the matter or that there 
ought to be an effort to challenge the decision and get it changed?” Again, in the preparations 
for the experiment, concerns were raised about the extent to which Norwegian citizens would 
ever feel that there are ways to challenge a Supreme Court decision. Following this discussion, 
a simplified version of this question was developed, asking only “Generally speaking, to what 
extent do you mean this would be an acceptable decision by the Supreme Court?” 
